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MOBILISING AFRICAN PARLIAMENTS TO ACT ON CLIMATE CHANGE

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Harnessing Parliamentary Diplomacy for the Realization of Global Solidarity, Equality, and Sustainability

Table of Contents

ACRONYMS

AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area
AU	African Union
CAAPD	Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme
CBAM	Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism
CO_2	Carbon Dioxide
COP	Conference of Parties to the Convention on Climate Change
ETS	Emissions Trading System
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
GST	Global Stocktake
$GtCO_2e$	gigatonnes of CO_2 equivalent
ICT	Information Communication and Technology
NAPs	National Adaptation Plans
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
PIDA	Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

KEY CONSIDERATIONS

- Due to increasing greenhouse gas emissions, the global temperature is projected to exceed the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C target substantially within a few years.
- African Union members contribute comparatively little to global emissions (collectively raising the total by only 5% when included), reinforcing the need for differentiated responsibilities and support for their climate adaptation.
- Implementing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is compatible with and can accelerate Africa's climate objectives.
- While many African countries have prioritised greenhouse gas emission reduction efforts, they should also channel resources towards climate change adaptation.
- Effective climate action requires parliaments to establish cross-party committees, provide training and access to experts, facilitate dialogue with stakeholders, and strengthen oversight to ensure transparent, inclusive, and equitable climate policies and finance.

1 INTRODUCTION

The global climate crisis continues to worsen, with increasing evidence that the world is dangerously deviating from the Paris Agreement's target. The internationally agreed target to keep the global temperature rise below 1.5°C of pre-industrial levels is becoming more challenging to achieve. If current patterns continue, global temperatures will exceed this limit within a few years, resulting in more frequent and severe climate-related disasters.[1] The November 2023 climate anomalies underscore this bleak outlook, where global temperatures temporarily exceeded 2°C above pre-industrial levels for the first time in recorded history. Every month of 2024 experienced record or near-record warmth, and the global annual mean near-surface temperature was 1.55°C above the 1850-1900 pre-industrial average.[2] This is a stark warning of what may happen if emissions are not urgently curbed. The Copernicus Climate Change Service projects that, at the current rate, the 1.5°C target of the Paris Agreement will stabilise by May 2029.[3] Focusing on the African Continent, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) found that the average temperature has increased faster than in other parts of the world, leading to an above-average increase of 0.86°C above the 1991-2020 average.[4]

The lived experiences with frequent and severe flooding, heavy rains, storms, tropical cyclones, heat waves, and droughts result in wildfires, deaths, economic losses, hunger, diseases, and numerous insecurities, including food, energy, and water. These experiences highlight the urgent need to address climate change collectively as a moral responsibility.[5] To meet the 1.5°C target by the end of the century, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions must drop by 42% by 2030 and 57% by 2035. Achieving these demands requires extraordinary global cooperation and annual emissions cuts of about 7.5% until 2035.[6]

This paper briefly highlights the key global and regional climate frameworks that inform the climate agenda, progress on their domestication, challenges and the role of Parliaments and parliamentarians in advancing climate action in Africa.

2 INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

2.1 International Frameworks or Agreements

The foundational international legal framework on climate change is the **United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change** (UNFCCC), which aims to encourage global efforts to combat climate change. The central goal under the UNFCCC is to stabilise the atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions, the ultimate goal being their reduction. While the framework does not establish binding targets, it advocates the principle of "Common but Differentiated

[1] UNEP (2024b).
[2] WMO (2025b).
[3] CCCS (2025).
[4] WMO (2025b).
[5] Ardoin & Bowers (2025).
[6] UNEP (2024b).

Responsibilities" among nations, emphasising that countries share a collective duty to tackle climate change, but their liabilities and capabilities vary. Hence, more of the burden of climate action should be placed on developed countries that contribute more significantly to the GHGs. Signatory countries have a responsibility to comply with decisions under the protocols and agreements adopted under the UNFCCC. The principal agreement is the 2015 Paris Agreement, which builds on the voluntary Kyoto Protocol.

The **Paris Agreement**, a legally binding international treaty on climate change, establishes long-term goals to guide all nations in significantly reducing their global GHG emissions.[7] It aims to keep the rise in global temperature well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5°C, recognising that doing so would significantly reduce the risks and impacts associated with climate change. Every five years, Parties to the Agreement should assess their collective progress towards meeting the Agreement's purpose and long-term goals. The global stocktake (GST) took place in 2023. The key messages from the GST were that there is progress towards climate action. However, it is insufficient to achieve the GHG emission reductions, enhance adaptation, scale up finance and uphold international cooperation.[8] Informed by the GST, each country is expected to submit an updated and more ambitious Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) every five years. To facilitate the implementation of the Agreement, financial mechanisms should be enhanced to support developing countries in mitigating climate change, building resilience, and improving their capacity to adapt to climate impacts.[9]

2.2 Regional Climate Frameworks

In **Agenda 2063**, the African Union envisions a Continent striving for a prosperous future, built on inclusive growth and sustainable development that uplifts every single person.[10] It envisions a Continent integrated and politically united, firmly rooted in the timeless ideals of Pan-Africanism and ignited by the spirit of an African Renaissance. Central to this ambitious vision is an Africa governed by robust institutions, where democracy flourishes, human rights are universally respected, and both justice and the rule of law are upheld across all nations. The Continent aspires to be a beacon of peace and security, free from the shackles of conflict, and driven by African-led solutions to its unique challenges. A vital element of this future is a deep sense of cultural pride, where Africa's rich identity, shared heritage, indigenous knowledge and ethical values are not only celebrated but also meticulously preserved. Development under Agenda 2063 will be inherently people-centred, actively harnessing the immense potential of all African citizens, with a particular focus on women, youth and children, to fuel progress from within.

Agenda 2063 is aligned with the **Sustainable Development Goals** (SDGs) and is supported by several policies adopted by the African Union that promote climate action for sustainable and prosperous African economic growth, social inclusion, and environmental sustainability. Agenda

[7] UNFCCC (2016).
[8] UNFCCC (2023).
[9] Ibid.
[10] African Union Commission (2014).

2063 is to be implemented through a series of five Ten-Year Implementation Plans that outline 20 Agenda 2063 Goals, linked to the seven aspirations. Each of these goals identifies the priority areas to be implemented at the national level to ensure that collectively, Africa will attain its developmental objectives. Within the context of climate change, several guiding frameworks advocate for, among other outcomes, climate-resilient economies and communities as part of supporting global climate action. These are briefly outlined below.

2.2.1 African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan (2022-2032)

This ten-year plan aims to unify the Continent's strategy on climate change, promoting joint efforts and collaboration to mitigate its effects and capitalise on opportunities associated with a green transition.[11] The plan identifies eight areas that African countries should prioritise: agriculture and food security, water resources, human settlements and infrastructure, energy, forests and ecosystems, health, disaster risk reduction, and gender issues. Member countries need to domesticate the strategy and plan, with short-to-medium-term deliverables aimed at building adaptive capacity and unlocking long-term, transformative, low-emission, climate-resilient development. Commitments to the strategy were further strengthened when the Nairobi Declaration was adopted in September 2023, emphasising the collective commitment by African leaders to tackle climate change and its impact on the Continent. Parliaments should receive regular updates on progress towards these noble goals.

2.2.2 Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP)

Since agriculture is vital to African food systems and livelihoods, the AU emphasises the urgent need for action through the **CAADP**. The sector is highly vulnerable to climate change, particularly the increasing extreme weather events that are reducing agricultural productivity and threatening food security in many African nations. African countries have undertaken to invest at least 10% of national budget to achieve a 6% growth rate of the sector to halve poverty, end hunger and enhance investment and climate resilience by 2025[12]. However, the Continent is far from achieving these goals, with only three countries allocating 10% of their national budget to agriculture, while only 11 countries achieved the 6% growth rate in 2024. All seven Malabo commitments[13] were missed. The reasons for poor performance against undertakings include poor oversight and accountability, incoherent or fragmented domestic policies, and a lack of political leadership and commitments.[14] Parliaments have a clear responsibility in ensuring that member countries develop and implement supportive programmes for a climate-resilient agricultural sector.

[11] African Union (2022).
[12] African Union Commission (2016).
[13] A set of goals adopted by the AU in 2014 to accelerate agricultural growth and transformation for shared prosperity and improved livelihoods. These commitments are central to the implementation of the CAADP and include recommitting to CAADP principles, enhancing investment in agriculture, ending hunger, halving poverty, boosting intra-African trade, enhancing resilience, and strengthening mutual accountability.
[14] Amameishi (2024).

2.2.3 The Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA)

This continental initiative (**PIDA**), adopted by all African countries, aims to mobilise resources to transform Africa with modern infrastructure, reduce poverty, and boost economic growth, integration, and living standards through enhanced regional and continental infrastructure networks in the energy, transport, cross-border water and information communication and technology (ICT) sectors. The infrastructure is planned to be climate-resilient, foster regional development, and promote sustainable solutions within its various sectors. The initiative has attracted US$82 billion, rolled out 82 projects, and increased intra-African trade by 16%. It is on course to lay 30,200 km of railway and 30,700 km of highways by 2040. Despite progress in Phase 1, investment remains insufficient for a Continent that needs up to $170 billion annually to upgrade its infrastructure in the second phase of the infrastructure programme. Financing PIDA's Phase 2 (2021-2030) will necessitate $161 billion.[15] Parliaments should regularly monitor and oversee that these projects remain on track, with sound governance, budget and financial management and that project-related problems are timeously addressed by their respective governments.

2.2.4 The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)

The **African Continental Free Trade Area** (AfCFTA) Agreement aims to create a single market for goods and services, increase intra-African trade, and promote sustainable socio-economic development of Africa, as envisioned in Agenda 2063.[16] The implementation of AfCFTA adopts a phased approach. Phase 1 primarily addresses trade in goods, trade in services, and the establishment of a dispute settlement mechanism, with most tasks nearly complete but a few issues still pending. Phase 2 expands to cover investment, intellectual property rights, competition policy, digital trade, and the inclusion of women and youth in trade.[17]

Implementing the AfCFTA will help Africa achieve its climate goals and accelerate the transition to renewable energy.[18] African countries working together to cut emissions is more effective than each country acting alone. Research also highlights that carbon pricing in Africa could be a powerful tool to help countries achieve their climate targets, thereby creating a greener and more prosperous Africa.[19] Parliaments can thus play a crucial role in ensuring that their respective countries develop and pass enabling domestic legislation to facilitate free trade, expand market access, increase access to finance, and cut red tape, thereby ensuring they are on track with the phased approach to implementing the AfCFTA.

[15] AUDA-NEPAD (2023).
[16] African Union (2018).
[17] Ibid.
[18] Fontagné et al. (2024).
[19] Ibid.

3 PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES

3.1 Climate Change Mitigation

The primary cause of climate change is the emission and buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. As a result, climate mitigation, which is actions taken by governments, businesses, or individuals to reduce or prevent greenhouse gases, or to strengthen carbon sinks that remove them, must be prioritised for enhancement. However, despite strong scientific consensus and the urgent nature of the problem, current climate commitments and actions worldwide are significantly inadequate.[20] Even if all nations fully implement their existing nationally determined contributions (NDCs), their self-imposed climate targets, the world will still face a catastrophic temperature increase of up to 3.1°C by 2100.[21] In 2023, global GHG emissions hit an unprecedented 57.1 gigatonnes of CO_2 equivalent ($GtCO_2e$), marking a 1.3% increase from 2022. Alarmingly, 68% of these emissions originated from the energy sector. Despite growing investments in clean energy technologies, fossil fuels, particularly coal, remain deeply ingrained in the global energy landscape, especially in rapidly developing economies.[22] Total energy-related CO_2 emissions increased by 0.8% in 2024 to 37.8 Gt CO_2, reaching a record high. Emissions from the energy sector continued to grow but at a slower rate in 2024 than in 2023, partly due to record-high temperatures. Rapid adoption of clean energy technology is helping to limit growth, preventing 2.6 billion tonnes of CO_2 emissions annually, and Africa is taking the necessary steps to increase the adoption of renewable energy.[23]

Africa still contributes minimally to global GHGs, despite committing to reducing its continental emissions. GHG emissions among G20 members also increased in 2023, accounting for 77% of global emissions. Including all African Union members increases the total global emissions percentage to 82%, a slight rise of only 5%. Nigeria and South Africa are collectively responsible for about 2% of these emissions.[24] This demonstrates that, despite having 55 member States (compared to the G20's 20 countries plus the EU and AU as of 2023), Africa's overall contribution to global emissions remains relatively low. This is especially remarkable considering Africa's large and expanding population. It also supports the argument that African nations, while highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, are not the main contributors to the problem. Despite projections of significant growth in emissions and population in Africa, the Continent's emissions remain understudied. Many countries lack recent, comprehensive assessments of GHG emissions and removals due to sporadic and often outdated reports from individual countries.[25] Due to this gap in emissions data, some African countries will be victims of climate policies from other countries and regions that will require climate action data as a requirement for carbon tax/tariffs exemptions.

[20] UNFCCC (2023).
[21] UNEP (2024b); WMO (2025b).
[22] UNEP (2024b).
[23] IEA (2025).
[24] Carman & Baumgartner (2022); UNEP (2024b).
[25] Mostefaoui et al., (2024).

The European Union (EU) is implementing the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which will affect African countries. The CBAM is designed to address carbon leakage, which occurs when companies relocate carbon-intensive production to countries with less stringent environmental regulations to avoid the costs associated with the EU's Emissions Trading System (ETS).[26] From 2026, CBAM will impose a carbon price on certain imported goods, mirroring the carbon cost of similar goods produced within the EU. This mechanism is intended to encourage global decarbonisation and ensure that EU industries are not disadvantaged by competition from less environmentally conscious producers. Many African countries have targeted carbon-intensive industries established through foreign direct investment, which could face heavy taxes unless they shift to carbon-free operations.

The EU has, however, undertaken to support least developed countries towards decarbonisation and transformation of their manufacturing industries.[27] African countries will thus need to accelerate vital mitigation measures or explore alternative markets that do not impose carbon taxes. Furthermore, countries are expected to balance domestic priorities with international commitments on issues such as phasing out unabated fossil fuels in electricity generation, stopping deforestation and degradation, and transitioning to zero-carbon transportation. African countries will need to gather data to inform the national stocktake, enhance their 2025 NDCs in 2025, to ensure ongoing access to some economies, and set new targets for 2035 and beyond.[28]

3.2 Climate Change Adaptation

Africa is experiencing extreme weather events, including droughts, floods, heatwaves, sea-level rise, biodiversity loss, food and water insecurity, and other climate-related hazards. These events occur more frequently and with greater intensity, are more deadly, and are causing costly disasters.[29] Climate change adaptation, which involves actions that help reduce vulnerability to the current or expected impacts of climate change, is thus critical to achieve. These climate disasters are severely impacting livelihoods and reversing gains made in addressing poverty, infrastructure, development, inequality, and many other socio-economic indicators. The Global Goal on Adaptation, a key component of the Paris Agreement commits Parties to enhancing resilience, reducing vulnerability, and supporting adaptation actions to support the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).[30]

All SDGs are directly and indirectly affected by climate change. Hence, achieving the Paris Agreement sets the global community on course to achieving the SDGs.[31] According to a recent analysis by the African Development Bank, climate change could result in a yearly reduction of up to 2% in Africa's GDP by 2050. Climate change costs in African countries can reach up to 5% of their GDP, significantly hindering development and efforts to reduce poverty across the

[26] Madalane (2023).
[27] European Union (2023).
[28] Boehm et al., (2023).
[29] WMO (2025a).
[30] UNFCCC (2023).
[31] UNDESA-UNFCCC (2024); WMO (2025a).

Continent.[32] Although international adaptation funding increased from US$22 billion in 2021 to US$28 billion in 2022, it still falls short of the estimated annual requirement of US$187 billion to US$359 billion.[33] The African Development Bank projects that Africa's adaptation financing gap from international sources ranges from $166 billion to $260 billion in 2020 – 2030. More than 40 African countries have completed or are working on their National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), but the quality and success of implementing these plans vary widely.[34]

As climate impacts grow more severe, raising awareness of effective adaptation strategies, strengthening policy frameworks, and fostering innovative technological solutions will be essential for building societal, economic, and ecological resilience in Africa.[35] The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) estimates that by 2030, up to 118 million extremely poor people (living on less than US$ 1.90 per day) will be exposed to drought, floods and extreme heat in Africa, if adequate response measures are not put in place. This will place additional burdens on poverty alleviation efforts and significantly hamper growth.[36] To better cope with climate change, African nations should focus on investing more in climate information systems. This means investing into tools like weather systems for farming, early warning systems for disasters, and ways to assess risks and vulnerability to climate change from the limited resources.

In some African countries, such as Namibia, South Africa and Rwanda, national governments are making notable investments in adaptation through their budget allocations.[37] However, in general, African States primarily relied on debt instruments (standard loans) for adaptation finance, accounting for 57%. This share has been rising, averaging 53% from 2017 to 2021, and is significant, considering the rapid growth of external debt in Africa, which has outpaced GDP growth since 2010. Concessional terms dominated, constituting 69% of debt instruments, while non-concessional loans were mainly utilised to fund middle-income countries in the region. Nevertheless, least developed countries in Africa have also obtained non-concessional debt for adaptation.[38]

Climate adaptation should not just focus on the environment. Other vulnerable sectors, such as agriculture, health, tourism, education and housing, amongst others, should have funded sectoral adaptation plans. This will help mitigate risks, build adaptive capacity, shorten recovery, boost resilience at local, national, and regional levels and guide sustainable development strategies. Part of the adaptation should explore economic diversification, social protection, research and development and technology adoption. Technological interventions should leverage traditional or indigenous technologies through nature-based solutions to increase acceptance of interventions. If these investments are locally led or community-run systems, they will help reduce risks, build the ability to adapt to changes, and strengthen resilience from local

[32] AfDB (2023).
[33] WMO (2025a).
[34] AfDB (2023).
[35] WMO (2025a).
[36] UNEP (2024a).
[37] DFFE (2023).
[38] UNEP (2024a).

communities all the way up to national and regional levels. Ultimately, this will guide strategies for sustainable development across the Continent. Parliaments will thus play an important role in ensuring that climate adaptation is equally prioritised, as is often the case with climate mitigation efforts.

3.3 Climate finance

Climate finance has been a significant challenge in climate action, as developed countries have not honoured their US$100 billion annual pledge towards global climate action. During COP15 in 2009, developed countries committed to mobilising US$100 billion a year by 2020 in the Copenhagen Accord for climate finance to support low- and middle-income countries.[39] However, bureaucratic and exclusionary criteria imposed during the application process effectively prevented many African countries from accessing the funds, with only a few countries on the Continent being exceptions.[40] The 2023 Oxfam Report found that:

- Developed countries restructured up to one-third of official aid as climate finance instead of new funding;
- Allocated more funds towards mitigation;
- Converted more than half of the grants into loans;
- Provided inadequate funding for adaptation, and
- Employed misleading accounting practices.[41]

As a result, many developing countries have found the climate financing process to be lacking in transparency, genuine accountability mechanisms, and the ability to incorporate local considerations, ownership, and responsiveness to the needs of the communities it is intended to reach.[42] On the contrary, developed countries celebrated fulfilling their Copenhagen commitment, although it was only achieved in 2022 through complex schemes and processes.[43]

At the COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, developed countries pledged to triple climate finance to developing countries, from the previous goal of US$100 billion annually, to US$300 billion annually by 2035. This pledge is voluntary, and countries can withdraw, hence it is not enforceable. Least developed and developing countries remain sceptical based on their experience when the pledge was US$100 billion.[44] The pledged amount is significantly less than the required amount, according to the 2023 African Economic Outlook Report by the African Development Bank. The report estimates that Africa will need between US$2.6 trillion and US$2.8 trillion by 2030 to fulfil its climate commitments outlined in countries' recent NDCs.[45] This translates to an estimated annual total climate finance need for Africa of US$277 billion.

[39] OECD (2024).
[40] Zagema *et al*, (2023).
[41] Ibid.
[42] Freitas & Mwaniki (2024).
[43] OECD (2024).
[44] Wei et al., (2025).
[45] ADB (2025).

Additionally, the United Nations projects that Africa requires US$1.3 trillion annually to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).[46] Therefore, closing Africa's climate finance gap and achieving the SDGs solely through domestic sources is not feasible.

The ongoing inability to access climate finance highlights the urgent need for African nations to examine and address the root causes of their limited access to climate funding. Despite increasing financial commitments worldwide, many African countries face difficulties securing climate finance due to a mix of systemic and institutional challenges.[47] These include weak negotiation skills to obtain favourable deals with development partners, fragmented and insufficient climate planning, and the lack of effective mechanisms to monitor climate finance flows. Furthermore, the absence of reliable data weakens evidence-based decision-making, while policy environments in many countries remain unfavourable for attracting climate investments. There are also notable gaps in public and institutional awareness of climate-related risks and opportunities, as well as limited access to the technologies necessary for effective climate action. These problems are not just technical but reveal critical governance gaps that demand robust oversight and accountability. African parliaments, as guardians of public interest and allocators of national budgets, should play an active role in climate finance. By enhancing their oversight of climate finance planning, execution, and reporting, parliaments can help guarantee that climate finance is mobilised efficiently, utilised strategically, and distributed fairly to promote resilient and sustainable development across the Continent.

4 ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS AND INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT

4.1 The role of legislation in addressing climate change

- Parliament plays a crucial role in addressing climate change, primarily through the power of legislation. Parliaments should thus ensure that countries have legislation that aligns with their international commitments and use their oversight role to ensure that such legislation is being implemented. Legislation should encourage governments to set ambitious targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, enhancing resilience and adaptation, particularly at this stage where countries are updating their NDCs.
- Parliaments should promote the development and deployment of renewable energy and other clean energy technologies by enacting laws that incentivise investment and facilitate the transition away from fossil fuels. For countries with high emissions, parliaments should actively review and potentially increase the price on carbon emissions, using legislative mechanisms to create economic disincentives for polluting activities, while also avoiding undermining local economic development.
- Parliaments should encourage a review or harmonising legislation and programmes across various sectors and governmental levels, thereby creating a coherent and effective framework that enables comprehensive climate action.

[46] Freitas & Mwaniki (2024).
[47] Freitas & Mwaniki (2024).

4.2 Best practices for parliamentary engagement on climate change

- Establishing cross-party committees specifically focused on climate change is crucial, as it fosters collaboration across political divides and ensures a more unified, long-term approach to a complex issue.
- Exposing parliamentarians to various climate change training programmes, ensuring they have access to experts or consistent dialogue between parliamentarians and diverse stakeholders. This equips them with the necessary knowledge to understand scientific data, policy implications, and potential solutions. Parliamentarians can then use this knowledge in their constituencies to create awareness, encourage, and support local (community and household) climate change mitigation and resilience initiatives and innovations.
- Establishing sustained collaborative relationships with civil society organisations, academic and research institutions and providing regular opportunities for engagement with parliamentary committees, including capacity building opportunities for parliamentarians and parliamentary officials. The networks and collaborations can then be extended to constituency work, where ideas can be converted to pilot projects or programmes.

4.3 Finances or Budget Allocation

- Allocate sufficient funds to climate-related initiatives, including renewable energy projects, energy efficiency programmes, and adaptation measures and should have impact-orientated indicators.
- Ensure that governments invest in climate-resilient infrastructure, such as flood-resistant roads, drought-tolerant agriculture, health systems, resilient buildings, etc.
- Protect vulnerable populations from the adverse impacts of climate change – e.g. technology for people living with disabilities, poor, rural and under-serviced communities.
- Foster public-private partnerships to leverage private sector resources and expertise for climate action. These partnerships could help resolve the primary barrier to accessing climate finance, such as the lack of a comprehensive NDC Investment Strategy.
- Parliaments should also ensure that their governments develop institutional capacity to gather and analyse climate data, as data scarcity has been identified as a key factor increasing perceived investor risk in African climate projects.
- Parliaments should ensure the integration of climate change into all government programmes, as its impact affects all sectors. Parliamentarians can then ensure that programmes implemented in their constituencies reflect integration of climate change, and associated responses.
- Track climate funding (e.g., taxes, levies, international grants, guarantees, concessional loans, commercial loans) and expenditures through robust systems to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of climate spending. Parliamentarians can thus help ensure transparency in climate funding of projects within their constituencies to keep communities informed and enable them to provide input on programmes in their areas.

4.4 Oversight and Accountability

- While sourcing climate finance is critical in the fight against climate change for governments, equally important is the development of domestic capacity between national and sub-national departments to coordinate and track climate finance and impacts on funded programmes. Parliaments must oversee this process in line with their parliamentary responsibilities.
- Requiring governments to report on their progress in meeting climate change targets, including regional commitments.
- Ensuring incremental growth in intra-Africa trade (African Continental Free Trade Area) by sourcing goods from African countries.
- Lobbying other parliaments globally and in the region to ensure their governments honour their climate commitments.

4.5 Changes in parliamentary business

- Determine and track carbon footprint or emissions from Parliament's operations and set clear targets and timelines to reduce them, including green procurement (recycled material).
- Promote transparency in parliamentary greening efforts by conducting an annual sustainability audit and publish the results.
- Ensure water and energy efficiency on the premises, while also reducing carbon miles where meetings can be held online.

5 CONCLUSION

Addressing the climate crisis fairly and sustainably demands a comprehensive approach to climate finance and policy. African countries should prioritise grants over loans to avoid worsening the already heavy debt burdens. Over-reliance on loans, even easy ones, risks diverting money from vital social and economic needs, hindering long-term development and regional trade. A just transition must be supported with dedicated funds for retraining workers, social protection, and diversifying economies, while equally investing in climate adaptation. This includes building resilient infrastructure, setting up early warning systems, and promoting climate-smart agriculture to protect communities from increasing climate impacts. On global trade, rules must adhere to the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities. Tools like the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism need careful design to prevent unfair pressure on developing economies that are already managing complex industrial changes. Parliaments must strengthen their oversight role. They need to ensure that climate policies and finances are transparent, inclusive, and fair, driving solutions that benefit every community.

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